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California’s SB 1437 and Its Applicability to Attempted Murder
Liability
VIOLETA ALVAREZ
Introduction
“It is a bedrock principle of the law and of equity that a person
should be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own
level of individual culpability.”1 With this in mind, it is reasonable to
expect a harsher punishment for someone who is the principal in
causing a death versus someone else who is not the principal actor.
Similarly, one would expect a harsher punishment for completed acts,
such as murder, than those that were mere attempts. However, this
has not always been the case. Historically, California’s felony murder
laws permitted an accomplice to be convicted of murder without
actually being the person who directly caused death, regardless of
whether they shared the intent to harm or kill.2 The bedrock principle
that punishment must be meted out according to one’s level of
individual culpability is at the core of the California Legislature’s
recent reforms to certain types of murder convictions.3
Under California’s Senate Bill 1437 (“SB 1437”), the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, were amended “to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony

1

Cal. S. 1437, 1015 § 1(d) (2018).
See Cal. S. 1437, 1015 Legislative Counsel Digest (2018) (“this bill would require
a principal in a crime to act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder
except when the person was a participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a specified felony in which a death occurred, and the person was the
actual killer…this bill would prohibit a participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of one of the specified first-degree murder felonies in which a death
occurs from being liable for murder, unless the person was the actual killer or the
person was not the actual killer...”).
3
Cal. S. 1437, supra note 1.
2
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who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”4 Advocates for
this reform argue that this doctrine has allowed prosecutors to have a
controlling bargaining chip in persuading defendants to agree to plea
bargains in attempted homicide cases, even when they lacked any
intent to harm someone.5 With these changes, made effective January
1, 2019, people who were convicted under the felony murder rule or
the natural and probable consequences theory but were not the
principal actor can petition the court to have their conviction vacated
and to be resentenced.6 Yet, SB 1437 makes no mention of its
applicability to those who were convicted of attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences theory. Given that attempted
murder is a lesser crime than murder, it is reasonable to infer that SB
1437 applies to the former as well as the latter. If not, individuals
convicted for an attempted murder under the ‘natural and probable
consequences’ doctrine would be punished more harshly than those
whose actions actually caused the death of another, violating the very
bedrock principles upon which the reforms were made. Simply put, if
SB 1437 does not apply to attempted murder, there is an incentive to
ensure the victim dies. Meaning, SB 1437 incentivizes murder.
The question of SB 1437’s applicability to attempted murder
liability has been challenged in various Courts of Appeal, and in late
2019, the California Supreme Court granted review.7 In this Note, I
argue that SB 1437 encompasses or should extend to those convicted
of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
4

People v. Gentile, 10 Cal. 5th 830, 842 (2020).
Jessica Pishko, Hundreds Stuck in California Prisons as Prosecutors Seek to Block
New Law, THE APPEAL (Mar. 25, 2019) https://theappeal.org/hundreds-stuck-inprison-in-california-as-prosecutors-seek-to-block-new-law/; see, e.g. “when you’re
facing life, it’s such a risk to throw the dice and maybe spend rest of your life in
prison versus when a prosecutor comes at you with a determinate (prison) term,”
Jenny Brandt, a California-based appeal attorney, said in an interview. She later
added, “the people who are being offered these deals, it’s not only that they’re less
culpable but it’s also that there’s less evidence against them”; see also Nate
Gartrell, ‘Justice is not on my side’: California courts’ interpretation of felony
murder rule change leaves out people who pleaded to manslaughter, THE MERCURY
NEWS (Mar. 20, 2021) https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/03/20/ca-felonymurder-law-change-doesnt-apply-to-people-who-plea-down-courts-rule/.
6
Cal. S. 1437, supra note 1.
7
People v. Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 5th 1087 (2019).
5
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theory as aider and abettors. The Note proceeds as follows. Part I
analyzes the history of California’s felony murder rule and the natural
and probable consequences theory. In particular, I examine the
implications of felony murder as it has been applied to nonprincipals—accomplices and aider and abettors, to the actual
deterrence of crime. I end Part I with a brief overview the history and
purpose of SB 1437. In Part II I directly address specific changes
made under SB 1437, and the open question currently before the
California Supreme Court regarding how SB 1437 has impacted the
law of attempted murder liability. Finally, in Part III, I argue that the
California Supreme Court should hold that attempted murder liability
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine is inherently
incorporated into SB 1437. I conclude by examining the California
Legislature’s role in clarifying the boundaries of SB 1437 and
encouraging action on their behalf to ensure just and fair sentencing.
I.

California’s Harsh Punitive Measures under The
Felony Murder Rule and the Natural and Probable
Consequences Doctrine

“There is a need for statutory changes to more
equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their
involvement in homicides. Reform is needed in
California to limit convictions and subsequent
sentencing so that the new law of California fairly
addresses the culpability of the individual and assists
in the reductions of prison overcrowding, which
partially results from lengthy sentences that are not
commensurate with the culpability of the
individual.”8
Under the old felony murder rule, accomplices were sentenced
uniformly to the person who committed the murder, meaning, they
could be given life sentences for a killing they neither intended or
personally committed. Similarly, under the traditional natural and
probable consequences doctrine, and aider and abettor could face
8

Cal. S. 1437, 1015 § 1(b)(e) (2018).
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murder and attempted murder liability without sharing the principal’s
intent.
A. Felony Murder - California Penal Code § 188 and § 189
The doctrine of felony murder has long been an outlier in the
law of homicide. Generally, in order to be convicted of first or seconddegree murder, the state has to prove the perpetrator had the requisite
mens rea— or mental state, when committing the crime.9 For murder
this means showing the person acted with “malice”, which can either
be “express” or “implied.”10 Express malice is present when someone
intends to kill whereas malice may be implied where, regardless of an
individual’s lack of intent to kill, the circumstances attending the
killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.11 In other words,
implied malice is “killing someone in a way that demonstrates a
callous disregard for the value of human life.”12
However, under
the felony murder rule, codified as Cal. Penal Code § 189, an aider
and abettor can be charged with murder—even if they neither intended
to cause the death of another or actually did so—so long as a death
occurs while in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, certain
felonies such as arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem,
kidnapping, and others punishable felonies under additional
sections.13
Thus, to gain a conviction under the felony murder rule as it
formerly existed, it did not matter if the defendant did not act with
express or implied malice. All the state would have to prove is that
the aider and abettor participated in one of the listed felonies, and that
a fatality occurred as a result. The rationale behind the felony murder
rule is that certain crimes are inherently dangerous, and society wants

9

CALCRIM 520, Penal Code § 187.
Id.
11
Cal. Penal Code § 188 (a)(2) (2019); see also CALCRIM 520, supra note 9, (“at
the time he/she acted/[or] failed to act, he/she knew his/her act/[or] failure to act was
dangerous to human life; and he/she deliberately acted/[or] failed to act with
conscious disregard for human/ [or] fetal) life”).
12
Legal Information Institute, Murder, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/murder.
13
Cal. Penal Code § 189(a) (2017).
10

Summer 2021

SB 1437

156

to deter individuals from engaging in them completely.14 Seen this
way, the felony murder laws established a kind of strict liability,
punishing perpetrators for fatalities resulting from the commission of
certain crimes,15 no matter what the individual’s underlying intent
was.
B. Aider and Abettor Liability Under the Natural and
Probable Consequences Doctrine
Traditionally, under an aider and abettor theory, a defendant
can be “vicariously” convicted if they assist, encourage, or facilitate a
crime, even though they are not the actual perpetrator of a particular
crime against a victim.16 However, they must share the perpetrator’s
intent to commit that original crime.17 Thus, a defendant can be
convicted if they knowingly aided a “target” crime, which “naturally
and foreseeably could have led to a more violent” one.18 The law
judges the death to be naturally foreseeable when, if viewed
objectively, it is reasonable to assume that a death could plausibly
result from the commission of that crime.19
In People v. Prettyman, the Supreme Court held that in order
for a defendant to be convicted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine20, the jury must decide whether the defendant
(1) with knowledge of the actual perpetrator’s unlawful purpose; and
(2) with the intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the
14

Felony
Murder,
JUSTIA,
https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/homicide/felony-murder/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2020).
15
Please note that the words “target” and “original” are used interchangeably
throughout this Note.
16
Frances Ternus, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine, FDAP (Jan.
2015),
http://www.fdap.org/downloads/articles_and_outlines/Natural_Probable_Conseque
nces.pdf.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
People v. Medina, 46 Cal. 4th 913, 920 (2009).
20
CALCRIM 402 (a natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable
person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes); first Cal. case
embracing this doctrine was People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331 (1907).
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commission of any target crime(s); (3) aided, promoted, encouraged,
or instigated the commission of the target crime(s).21 Further, it is also
a necessity for the jury to find that (4) the defendant’s partner and main
principle committed an offense other than the target crime, and (5) the
offense committed by the principle was a natural and probable
consequence of the target crime that the defendant aided and abetted.22
Take, for example, three people who agree to steal a car.
Person A and B are driven by person C, who stays in the car while A
and B commit the crime—actually stealing the car. Person A ends up
shooting the driver of the car they are attempting to steal without
person B or C agreeing to it or having planned it beforehand. Even if,
hypothetically, the driver survives, Person A may still be liable for an
attempted murder. Moreover, although neither B nor C has manifested
any actual intent to cause the death of another, they may too be liable.
In this scenario, person B, and even C—who waited in the car, can be
found guilty and convicted of attempted murder if the “shooting of the
car owner” was a natural and foreseeable event of the grand theft auto
in this case. Under the traditional felony murder rules, the malice of
Person A would be imputed to Persons B and C. SB 1437 changed
this, disallowing malice supporting a homicide to be imputed23 to a
crime participant merely for agreeing to the original crime.
Moreover, the main difference when being charged as an aider
and abettor under the felony murder rule versus the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, prior to SB 1437, is strict liability.
The felony murder rule has strict liability based on the target felony
intended to be committed—if it’s one of the listed felonies—whereas
the natural and probable consequences theory looks at the defendant’s
level of criminal conduct, surrounding circumstances, and facts and
then applies an objective standard. However, this was modified under
SB 1437.
C. Changes Under Senate Bill 1437
21

People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th 248, 262 (1996).
Id.
23
“The word ‘impute’ ... means to bring into the reckoning, to attribute or to ascribe.
It is sometimes used to attribute vicariously,—to ascribe as derived from another.’
” (BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 908 (11th ed. 2019), quoting PERKINS & BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 605 (3d ed. 1982)).
22
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SB 1437 was a multiyear effort that commenced in 2016 and
resulted in reform to the felony murder rules discussed above.24 The
work behind it was borne out of advocates’ “personal experiences with
clients, incarcerated individuals and family members with loved ones
serving life sentences under this antiquated doctrine.”25 Through the
work of legal advocates and communities impacted by the felony
murder rules, SB 1437 brought the injustice of the felony murder rule
into the spotlight for many who were previously unaware of its
impact.26 In 2017, Senate Concurrent Resolution (SCR) 48 passed
both houses of the legislature,27 recognizing the need for statutory
changes to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their
involvement in the crime.28
Shortly after SCR 48 was passed,
Democratic Senator Nancy Skinner, authored the bill along with
Republican Senator, Joel Anderson.29 Senator Skinner called the bill
a “fair and reasonable fix” to the felony murder law.30 The Bill was
approved by Governor Brown on September 30, 2018, and went into
effect January 1, 2019.31 There were some challenges from some
district attorneys’ offices contending the bill was violation of SB the

24

Alexandra Mallick and Kate Chatfield, California Accomplices to a Felony
Shouldn’t Be Sentence Like the One Who Committed the Murder, JUV. JUST. INFO.
EXCHANGE (Aug. 8, 2018), https://jjie.org/2018/08/08/accomplices-to-a-felonyshouldnt-be-sentenced-like-the-murderer-in-california/.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
S. Con. Res. 48, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SC
R48.
29
Chatfield & Mallick, supra note 24. (It is important to note that SB 1437 does not
abolish the felony murder rule. It simply amends it, so that only those who actually
killed, who aided the killing with the intent to kill, or who acted with reckless
disregard to human life during the course of the felony may be convicted of murder.
Under this bill, prosecutors would no longer be able to substitute the intent to commit
a crime for the intent to commit murder).
30
Darrell Smith, DAs urge Brown to veto crime bills, calling them ‘serious threats
to
public
safety,’
THE
SACRAMENTO
BEE,
(Sep.
6, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article217893180.html.
31
S.B. 1437, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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California Constitution, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument and
upheld its validity.32
With the passage of Senate Bill 1437, three separate provisions
of the Penal Code were amended, two of them being Section 188 and
189.33 Under section 188, ‘malice’ was redefined. Now, in order to be
convicted of murder, a principal must act with malice aforethought
and malice cannot be imputed to a person solely on their participation
in a crime.34 As courts have construed it, this means that SB 1437 has
eliminated liability for murder, regardless of the degree, under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.35
32

See Danielle Silva, Court Upholds SB 1437 Constitutionality after Orange County
DA Denied Petition Review, DAVIS VANGUARD (Mar. 19, 2020) (“[i]n November
2019, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One, determined the
constitutionality of SB 1437 under the People v. Gooden (2019) and People
v. Lamareoux (2019). Their conclusions were published, allowing them to be used
in case law. The arguments against SB 1437’s constitutionality stated the bill
amended two voter-approved laws: Proposition 7, which increased the punishment
for first- and second-degree murder, and Proposition 115, which expanded the
definition of first-degree murder to include “murders occurring during the
commission or attempted commission of kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act
punishable under sections 286, 288, 288a, or 289.” Two of the three justices that
heard the oral arguments rejected these arguments. One justice, however, in his
dissenting opinion stated that Proposition 7 was amended under SB 1437, as the
elements of a crime and punishment were argued to be closely linked. The District
Attorney of San Diego, the plaintiff in these cases, filed for a review and depublication of the opinion to the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court,
however, denied both requests, making the Lamareoux and Gooden decisions the
current highest standing case law in California.”); see also Alexei Koseff, California
prosecutors push to overturn new law on who can be guilty of murder, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Jul. 9, 2019) (“[A]cross the state, prosecutors have filed to
block petitions for resentencing because they believe the new law is
unconstitutional.”).
33
S.B. 1437, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
34
S.B. 1437, sec. 2, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). See Cal. Penal Code §
188, subd. (a)(3).
35
People v. Gentile, 10 Cal. 5th 830, 847-848 (2020) (“[i]f Senate Bill 1437 were
inapplicable to second degree murder, there would have been no need to include
second degree murder among the convictions eligible for relief under section
1170.95. Apart from the Court of Appeal decision in this case, every published Court
of Appeal opinion to address the issue has concluded that Senate Bill 1437
eliminates natural and probable consequences liability for murder regardless of
degree”).
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Section 189—which defines first and second degree murder—
was modified to include subdivision (e).36 Under this subdivision, a
participant in the crimes enumerated in subdivision (a) is liable under
the felony murder doctrine only if: “(1) the person was the actual
killer,” (2) the person was not the actual killer but, with the intent to
kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the actual commission of
murder in the first degree, [or] (3) the person was a major participant
in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life.”37
The third provision of SB 1437 is the added Section 1170.95
to the Penal Code, which makes the amendments to sections 188 and
189 retroactive to those who were previously convicted and qualify.38
Section 1170.95 states that if a person has been convicted of felony
murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory,
they “may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to
have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced
on any remaining counts when” certain conditions are met.39 This
applies to cases where the petitioner was convicted following a trial or
chose to take a plea deal.40
This leads us to what is not specifically mentioned in the text
of SB 1437, its application to those who were convicted as aiders and
abettors under the natural and probable consequences doctrine for
attempted murder, as opposed to murder. In particular, it is not clear
from the text whether those convicted under the aforementioned
doctrine can petition a trial court pursuant to Penal Code § 1170.95 to
have their murder convictions vacated and be resentenced. SB 1437
leaves much room for speculation and assumptions on this matter. The
cases that will be discussed in the next section deal specifically with
answering that particular question.

36

S.B. 1437, sec. 3, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
Id.; see Cal. Penal Code § 189, subd. (f), (does not apply to a defendant when the
victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of his or her duties).
38
S.B. 1437, sec. 4, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
39
S.B. 1437, sec. 4, 2017-2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); see Cal. Penal Code §
1170.95.
40
Cal. Penal Code § 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).
37
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Interpretation of Senate Bill 1437 by California’s
Court of Appeal

This Part details the major cases and statutes encompassing SB
1437 and how they intertwine with each other. In addition, this Part
further explains the current circuit split in terms
of attempted murder applicability under SB 1437. Such liability is not
specifically mentioned in the bill, and the rationales of each Court of
Appeal underscore the diversity of approaches to this question.
Table 1: Some of the current cases discussed currently considering
SB 1437 and its applicability to attempted murder.
Case
People v.
Lopez, 38
Cal. App.
5th
1087
(2019)

People v.
Munoz, 39
Cal. App.
5th
738
(2019)

People v.
Medrano,
42
Cal.
App.
5th
1001
(2019)

Crime
Convicted of
Murder
and
attempted
murder under the
natural
and
probable
consequences
doctrine.

Court
of
Appeal
Second
District,
Division 7.

Decision

Status

Held that SB
1437 does not
include
attempted
murder
and
reaffirmed
conviction.

Attempted
murder under the
theories of felony
murder or natural
and
probable
consequences
(on basis of
imputed malice).
Attempted
murder under the
natural
and
probable
consequences
theory

Second
District,
Division 3.

Held that SB
1437 does not
include
attempted
murder
and
reaffirmed
conviction.

Supreme
Court
of
California
granted
review on
11/13/2019.
Hearing
date
pending.
Supreme
Court
of
California
granted
review on
11/26/2019.

Fifth
District.

Held that SB
1437
includes
attempted
murder
and
overturned
conviction—
since
jury
convicted under
invalid theory of
accomplice
liability.

California
Supreme
Court
granted
review on
3/11/2020.
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People v.
Sanchez,
46
Cal.
App.
5th
637 (2020)

SB 1437

Attempted
murder under the
aider and abettor
theory or the
natural
and
probable
consequences
doctrine.

Fifth
District
(different
panel than
in People v.
Medrano).
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Agreed
with
Medrano,
and
overturned
conviction.

California
Supreme
Court
granted
review on
6/10/2020.

A. Court of Appeal Cases Declining to Extend SB 1437
Before SB 1437 was enacted, dealing with the culpability of
aiders and abettors was before the Supreme Court of California
pending review. That case, People v. Mateo, presented the question,
whether, to convict an aider and abettor of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, a premeditated attempt to murder had to have
been a natural and probable consequence of the target offense.41 Many
other cases were pending on that decision. The appeal in People v.
Lopez, was originally deferred pending the consideration of the related
issue in Mateo. Before Mateo could be heard, SB 1437 was enacted,
and the Supreme Court of California transferred the Lopez’ case—and
others similar—back to the Courts of Appeal instructing them to
vacate their decision and reconsider it in light of SB 1437.42 However,
the Court in Lopez held that Lopez’s attempted murder conviction was
unimpacted by SB 1437 when it reconsidered the case.
The appellants in Lopez, Janeth Lopez and Ivy Navarrete, were
convicted at trial of second degree murder and attempted premeditated
murder in 2015.43 Their associate shot and killed one of the victims
while injuring the second victim as they participated in an act of
vandalism—spraying graffiti on a wall.44 Both Lopez and Navarrate
were not the principals;45 Lopez sprayed graffiti along with the
41

People v. Mateo, 2019 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 4576 at *1.
Lopez, supra note 7 at 1092.
43
Id. at 1097.
44
Id. at 1091.
45
Id.
42
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principal, and Navarrate was the driver.46 Their convictions were
established under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
based on the underlying felony and that it was committed for the
benefit of a street gang.47
In 2019, Lopez and Navarrete urged a Court of Appeal in the
Second District to “extend the legislation’s ameliorative provisions to
their convictions for attempted premeditated murder.”48 The Court
began its analysis noting that any case which involves statutory
interpretation requires the fundamental task of determining the
Legislature’s intent for the court accomplish the law’s purpose.49
Because where statutory language is unambiguous, there is a
presumption that the Legislature meant what it said,50 the Court found
nothing ambiguous in the language of SB 1437. Rather, the Court
noted that there’s an omission of any reference to attempted murder
and clearly identifies its purpose as the need.51 Additionally, they
stated that if the “Legislature meant to include “attempts” among
covered offenses, it could have easily done so and that “an attempt is
an offense ‘separate’ and ‘distinct’ from the completed crime.”52
The decision was appealed, and the Supreme Court of
California granted review on November 13, 2019.53 The Court limited
the issues to be briefed and argued to the following: (1) Does Senate
Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) apply to attempted murder
liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine? and
(2) In order to convict an aider and abettor of attempted willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, must a premeditated attempt to murder have

46

Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1097.
48
Id. at 1103.
49
Id. at 1103-04; see People v. Scott, 58 Cal. 4th 1415, 1421 (2014) (“As in any case
involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the
Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose.”).
50
Lopez, supra note 7 at 1104; see People v. Hudson, 38 Cal. 4th 1002, 1009 (2006)
(if language is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute controls).
51
Lopez, supra note 7 at 1104.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1087.
47
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been a natural and probable consequence of the target offence?54 A
hearing date on the merits is yet to be scheduled. Lopez is the first
petition where review was granted on this matter.
Shortly after Lopez was heard in the Court of Appeal, Second
District, a similar case was also decided in the same district but in a
different Division.55 In People v. Munoz, Munoz was convicted,
following a jury trial, of two counts of premeditated attempted
murder.56 The conviction was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal and
then appealed to the Supreme Court of California. As in Lopez, further
action was pending decision on Mateo and the Supreme Court of
California transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal, where they
reaffirmed the conviction once again.57 The Court of Appeal again
held that SB 1437 only applies to persons convicted of murder, not
attempted murder.58
As in Lopez, the Munoz Court explained that it must start by
examining the statute’s words, which are given the usual and ordinary
meaning and if there’s no ambiguity, then plain meaning of the
statutory language controls and they look no further.59 The Court held
that they “do not find the statute ambiguous. It expressly identifies the
offense within its scope, all of which are completed offenses. Had the
legislature meant to include attempts among the covered offenses, it
could have easily done so.”60 Additionally, they mention that their
“colleagues in Division Seven recently came to the same conclusion,”
referring to the Lopez case. Munoz appealed the Court of Appeal
decision and the California Supreme Court granted review on

54

People v. Lopez, 451 P.3d 777 (Cal. 2019) (regarding second question to be
argued) (“In other words, should People v. Favor, 54 Cal. 4th 868 (2012), be
reconsidered in light of Alleyne v. United States 570 U.S. 99, 133 (2013) and People
v. Chiu 59 Cal. 4th 155, 172 (2014)?”).
55
The Second District Court of Appeal is made up of eight Divisions of
four Justices each; About The 2nd District, CAL. CTS., THE JUD. BRANCH OF
CAL., https://www.courts.ca.gov/2127.htm#:~:text=It%20is%20now%20made%20
up,the%20Los%20Angeles%20Superior%20Court.
56
People v. Munoz, 39 Cal. App. 5th 738, 742 (2019).
57
Id. at 743.
58
Id. at 751.
59
Id. at 753.
60
Id. at 754.
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November 26, 2019, further action deferred pending consideration and
disposition of Lopez’s case.61
B. Court of Appeal Cases Extending SB 1437 to Include
Attempted Murder Convictions
In yet another similar case that was decided soon after Munoz,
the Court of Appeal took a different approach. In People v. Medrano,
the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that SB 1437 was applicable to
attempted murder.62 In that case, the defendant, Mr. Medrano, was
found guilty after a jury trial of attempted murder (along with other
crimes) under the natural and probable consequence of aiding and
abetting an assault likely to cause bodily harm.63 The California
Supreme Court had also granted review to Mr. Medrano, pending
Mateo, but as it did in Lopez and Munoz, returned the case to the Fifth
District Court of Appeal with directions to vacate their opinion and
reconsider in light of SB 1437. When the Fifth District heard the case,
it took a different approach than the Second District Court of Appeal.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that SB 1437 precludes any
imposition of vicarious liability under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine if the charged offense requires malice
aforethought.64 They reasoned that the natural and probable
consequences doctrine is no longer a viable theory of accomplice
liability for attempted murder since malice can no longer be imputed
to a defendant who aids and abets a target offense without the intent
to kill.65 “We acknowledge two of our sister courts have held Senate
Bill 1437 does not affect the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as it related to attempted murder. However, we respectfully
disagree with their analysis and conclusions…”66
The Court of Appeal gave various reasons for the disagreement
with their sister courts. First, they disagreed with the Lopez decision
61

Munoz, supra note 56 at 742.
People v. Medrano, 42 Cal. App. 5th 1001, 1013 (2019).
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Id. at 1007.
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Id. at 1013.
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Id.
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Id.
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which held that, although SB 1437 eliminates aider and abettor
liability for murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, “the imposition of vicarious liability for attempted murder
under the same doctrine is not based on imputed malice.”67 Second,
the Medrano Court was not persuaded by Lopez’s reliance on the
absence of “attempted murder” language in SB 1437.68 They reason
that the omission is meaningless considering that Penal Code sections
187, 188, and 189 have also never included that term, yet, these
statutes together coupled with Penal Code section 21a—which
explains the law of attempt—are the basis for all attempted murder
convictions.69 Third, they discuss the amended section 188 under SB
1437 which states that “malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” The Medrano court
reasoned that the omission of specific reference to attempted murder
prosecutions was immaterial, as the Penal Code was clear that malice
may not be imputed by the commission of another crime, and makes
no exceptions for attempted murder which undeniably requires
express malice—"synonymous with the intent to kill.”70
The Medrano Court held that the Legislature’s failure to
exclude attempted murder from section 188 means they intended for
the provisions to apply to all crimes that require express malice
because they could have easily said, “Except for attempted murder,
malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.”71 Inclusively, they point to Section 188
where “except” appears in the previous sentence to exclude felonymurder prosecutions from the scope of the provision.72 “When the
Legislature ‘has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded
it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ”73
Consequently, Medrano’s attempted murder conviction was reversed.
The State of California appealed decision and the California Supreme
67

Id. at 1014.
Id.
69
Id. (“An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: a specific intent to
commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.”).
70
Id. at 1014-1015.
71
Id. at 1015.
72
Medrano, supra note 62 at 1013; see Cal. Penal Code §188(a)(3).
73
Medrano, supra note 62 at 1015.
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Court granted review on March 11, 2020, also pending Lopez’s
decision.74
In March 2020, in People v. Sanchez, a different panel of the
Fifth District Court of Appeal sided and agreed with the court’s
holding in Medrano and reversed Sanchez’ conviction.75 Sanchez was
convicted of attempted murder after an acquaintance fired a shotgun
during an altercation with other men.76 The prosecutor in that case
argued that Sanchez should be convicted for directly aiding and
abetting the shooter and alternatively, that the attempted murder was
a natural and probable consequence of an assault with a firearm.77
During the appeal, the Court specifically said they agreed with
the analysis in Medrano—"under statutory construction principles,
malice imputing prohibition applies to attempted murder” and
disagreed with Munoz and Lopez.78 In addition to the principles of
statutory construction discussed above, the Court relied on public
policy reasoning to reach their conclusion that SB 1437 applies to
attempted murder. “Limiting SB 1437’s malice imputing prohibition
to murder has the absurd consequences of incentivizing murder.”79
The court reasoned that a necessary principle of statutory construction
should not give the language of the statute a literal meaning if doing it
would bring about absurd consequences.80 As in Medrano, this case
was also granted review by the California Supreme Court, pending
Lopez’s decision.81
Since SB 1437 went into effect, many more petitions have
been filed for resentencing of attempted murder convictions based on
aiding and abetting theory under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.82 Currently, more than 80 cases have been
74

Id. at 1013.
People v. Sanchez, 46 Cal. App. 5th 637, 642 (2020).
76
Id. at 639.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 643.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 643. See also People v. Cook, 60 Cal. 4th 922, 929-30 (2015) (a fundamental
principle of statutory construction is that the language of a statute should not be
given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences).
81
Sanchez, supra note 75 at 642.
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Central California Appellate Program, Murder--SB 1437's Application to
Attempted Murder Liability Under the NPC Doctrine and Aider and Abettor
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granted review83 and are all pending the Supreme Court of California
decision once it hears the Lopez case. Responding to the circuit split
on the question of SB 1437’s applicability to attempted murder
convictions, many others have stepped into the debate.84
III.

Basic Principles of Statutory Construction as Well as
Fundamental Fairness Require that Attempted
Murder be Incorporated Into Senate Bill 1437.

The fundamental principle cited above, “that a person should
be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level of
individual culpability,” demand that SB 1437’s proscription on
imputing malice based on the participation in another crime be
extended to attempted murder convictions.
First, and most
importantly, the ambiguities in the reforms demand that legislature
should act.85 An amendment to the law explicitly laying out that there
can no longer be convictions for natural and probable consequences
attempted murder as an aider and abettor, prior to the California
Supreme Court hearing on People v. Lopez (hearing date still pending)
would most directly address the current debate. Secondly, regardless
of whether the legislature steps in, the Supreme Court of California
should rule that attempted murder liability under the natural and
Liability, https://www.capcentral.org/high_court/casedetails?id=742 (last updated
Mar. 24, 2021).
83
Id.
84
See J. Bradley O’Connell, S.B. 1437 – Reformation of Murder Liability Promises
and Perils, FIRST DISTRICT APP. PROJECT (Jan. 2020), https://www.fdap.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/SB_1437.pdf; Aileen Chinchilla, Attempted Murder to
apply under the SB 1437 new law, https://www.change.org/p/gavin-newsomattempted-murder-to-apply-under-the-sb-1437-new-law (last visited May 4,
2021); Nate Gartrell, ‘Justice is not on my side’: California courts; interpretation of
felony murder rule change leaves out people who pleaded to manslaughter, THE
MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 20, 2021), https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/03/20/cafelony-murder-law-change-doesnt-apply-to-people-who-plea-down-courtsrule/; Alex Rifkin, Unconstitutionally Redefining Murder: CA Legislature takes a
significant overstep with S.B. 1437, GGU LAW REVIEW BLOG (Oct. 14,
2019), https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1066&cont
ext=ggu_law_review_blog.
85
Branches of the U.S. Gov’t, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/branches-ofgovernment (last visited May 4, 2021).
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probable consequences doctrine is no longer a possibility if predicated
under “imputed malice” because of it remains in the ambit of SB 1437.
In other words, the Court should affirm the Fifth District’s analysis
that attempted murder—not just murder—also falls under SB 1437.
Failure to do so will only incentivize murder and is contradictory to
crime deterrence and just and fair punishment in general.
A. The California Legislature Should Act to Modify
Senate Bill 1437 to Explicitly Include Attempted
Murder
Currently, there are two ways to ensure attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine is covered under
SB 1437, through statute or through the courts. As the representative
branch of government, it is presumed that legislation represents the
voices of the people.86 In passing SB 1437, the legislature stepped
into the complex law surrounding imputed malice and felony murder.
Therefore, SB 1437 and its application to attempted murder should be
clarified through those representatives to forestall potential abrogation
of that law from the California Supreme Court. This is not meant to
diminish the role of the courts in determining these issues, but rather,
to allow the ultimate decision to fall on the people vis-a-vis legislation.
Further, even if the California Supreme Court were to hear the case
prior to the Legislature stepping in, Legislative action may still be
necessary to ensure the proscriptions of SB 1437 are codified in the
penal code instead of case precedent, since the latter can ultimately
change.87 The legislature should step in to be clear the elimination of
86

See NATL. CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA: VOICES OF THE PEOPLE,
https://www.ncsl.org/legislatorsstaff/legislators/trust-for-representative-democracy/representative-democracy-inamerica-voices-of-the-people.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2021); See also U.S.
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(last
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the use of imputed malice should apply to convictions for attempted
murder, as well as those for felony murder.88 Such an act would serve
to make permanent a decision by the Supreme Court expanding SB
1437 to attempted murder liability and, if it does not, would serve to
clarify the legislatures ultimate intent on the issue.89
When SB 1437 was enacted, the Legislature stated that there
is a “bedrock principle of the law and of equity that a person should
be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level of
individual culpability.”90 It also stated that California needed reform
in limiting convictions to fairly address the culpability of the
individual and thus, support the reduction of prison overcrowding—
partly coming from lengthy sentences which are not proportionate to
authority for deciding subsequent cases involving identical or similar facts, or
similar legal issues. Precedent is incorporated into the doctrine of stare decisis and
requires courts to apply the law in the same manner to cases with the same facts.
Some judges have stated that precedent ensures that individuals in similar situations
are treated alike instead of based on a particular judge’s personal views”).
88
CORNELL LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, COMMON
LAW, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/common_law (last visited Jan. 21, 2021)
(“[a]t the state level, legislatures often subsequently codify common law rules from
the courts of their state, either to give the rule the permanence afforded by a
statute, to modify it somehow (by either expanding or restricting the scope of the
common law rule, for example) or to replace the outcome entirely with legislation”).
89
Id. (“[a]n example that gained national attention was the 2018 California Supreme
Court decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, which
articulated a three-part test for determining whether California workers were
independent contractors or employees for purposes of California labor law. The
California Legislature responded by creating a new section of the Labor
Code, 2750.3, which codified and expanded on the Dynamex holding and went into
effect on January 1, 2020); see also Ricardo Aranda, AB 5-California Legislature
Weighs in on the Dynamex Decision Regarding California Independent
Contractors, SAN JOAQUIN BAR ASSN. (Jan. 3, 2021), https://www.sjcbar.org/newsindex/ab-5-california-legislature-weighs-in-on-the-dynamex-decision-regardingcalifornia-independent-contractors (“AB 5 is the Legislature’s response
to Dynamex, and actually confirms that the ABC test is “the law of the land” when
deciding whether an individual is an employee or contractor. AB 5 codifies the ABC
test articulated in Dynamex…”); HANSON BRIDGETT LABOR & EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICE, SB 327 RENDERS GERARD V. ORANGE COAST MEDICAL CENTER
MOOT (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.hansonbridgett.com/Publications/articles/201510-12-labor-employment_sb327-gerard-v-orange?pdf=1.
90
CA Senate Bill No. 1437, Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015, Sec. 1, subd. (d).
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the actual culpability of the individual.91 Though the law enacted does
not explicitly mention attempted murder in the revisions of Penal Code
sections 188 and 189, the legislative intent is clear based the principles
stated in Section 1 of the statute.92 If a person is to be punished based
on their own level of culpability, it would be irrational for someone to
argue that attempted murder is not a lesser crime than murder. Thus,
for someone to contend that SB 1437 only applies to cases in which
an actual murder resulted, is absurd, and contrary to the clear intent of
the legislature. Further, when SB 1437 was being drafted, this issue
was not anticipated, as mentioned by one of the legislative lead
drafters, Kate Chatfield, and discussed more in detail in the following
section.93
B. The Supreme Court of California Should Hold that
Senate Bill 1437 Is Applicable to Attempted Murder
Due to the omission of “attempted murder” in sections 188 and
189 under SB 1437, courts have been split as to the ultimate impact of
the SB 1437 legislation since its 2019 effective date.94 As mentioned
earlier, the California Supreme Court has granted review to Lopez, and
many others, to address this particular issue.95 In light of this, I
maintain that the Court should hold that SB 1437 applies to attempted
murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
based on legislative intent,96 principles of criminal liability, and
fundamental equity.
91

CA Senate Bill No. 1437, Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015, Sec. 1, subd. (e).
CA Senate Bill No. 1437, Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015, Sec. 1, subd. (b) (to effect
“statutory changes to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their
involvement in homicides”).
93
Telephone interview with Kate Chatfield, Dir. of Pol’y, The Justice Collaborative
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CA Senate Bill No. 1437, Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015.
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Lopez, supra note 54.
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Legislative Intent, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Legislative_intent (last
visited Jan. 20, 2021) (“Legislative intent is a practice used by judges, lawyers and
other court officials to determine the goals of legislators at the time of a bill's
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For cases involving statutory interpretation, the court has to
determine the Legislature’s intent to effectuate the law’s purpose.97 In
another case where the California Supreme Court discussed statutory
interpretation, People v. Cook, they went further.98 The Court
mentioned that “a fundamental principle of statutory construction is
that the language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if
doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature
did not intent.99 With that in mind, let’s analyze SB 1437.
Though attempted murder is not explicitly mentioned, the
intent of the legislature and purpose was very direct in Section I, to
fairly address disproportionate punishments meted out under an
imputed malice theory and render punishment appropriate for an
individual’s level of culpability.100 The act removed “malice” from
being attributed to a person solely on their participation in a crime,
thus, pointing to the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
defunct theory to prove accomplice liability for attempted murder.101
Moreover, by this standard, it is irrational to impute a harsher
punishment to the perpetrator when the victim does not succumb to
their injuries and survives than when they do. Further, when speaking
to Kate Chatfield—the lead drafter and organizer for SB 1437, she
agreed.102
On October 13, 2020 I spoke with Kate Chatfield, one of the
drafters of SB 1437, via telephone to ask for some clarity on the
purpose and intent of SB 1437.103 She mentioned that she was a law
student when she heard about the felony murder rule and thought it
was not right, which sparked her interest in pursuing the issue years
The use of more detailed research into legislative intent can stem from vague or
general language that does not address the matter at hand”).
97
People v. Gonzalez, 2 Cal. 5th 1138, 1141 (2017) (“As in any case involving
statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature's
intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. We begin by examining the statute's
words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning”).
98
People v. Cook, 60 Cal. 4th 922 (2015).
99
Id. at 927.
100
CA Senate Bill No. 1437, Stats. 2018, Ch. 1015, Sec. 1.
101
See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 74 at 637.
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103
Id.

173

Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment

[Vol. 2:2]

later.104 When asked whether SB 1437 intended to include attempted
murder and if so, why was it not included in the statute language, she
responded that at that time, People v. Mateo had already been granted
review by the California Supreme Court and that those involved in
the drafting of SB 1437 anticipated that attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences theory would be eliminated.105
This expectation was based on theory that when legislation for a
greater crime passes, the lesser crime does not exist anymore.106 She
said they did not imagine that the CA Supreme Court would transfer
the case back to the Court of Appeal in light of SB 1437 for
reconsideration instead of addressing it first.107 Chatfield expressed
that she finds it absurd for someone to get a greater sentence when a
victim remains alive than when they do not.108 She also said she hopes
the Supreme Court of California rules in Lopez’ favor—for attempted
murder to be included under SB 1437 and that if not, believes the
Legislature will.109
Further, fundamental justice for those most impacted by
California’s felony murder laws requires that SB 1437 be applied to
attempted murder convictions. Two family members of people
currently incarcerated, whose convictions were based on the natural
and probable consequences theory for attempted murder, share the
same sentiments as Kate Chatfield.110 One said, “I am baffled by the
fact that courts really do not think SB 1437 should apply to attempted
murder when it applies to a higher crime. It makes no sense to think
that my son would be home if the victim had been killed.”111 The other
family member said she really hopes the California Supreme Court
will see how absurd it will be for SB 1437 not to apply.112
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The Court of Appeal in the Second and Fifth District ruled on
this specific issue and yielded different results. The Second District
has opted to exclude attempted murder under the SB 1437 authority.113
However, two distinct Court of Appeal’s in the Fifth District have
done the exact opposite.114 In analyzing all pertinent cases, the Fifth
District’s decision broadly interpreting SB 1437 has the better
argument. The argument in Munoz contends that an attempted murder
charge could be punished with a sentence lengthier than that of one
imposed on a person with a murder charge. Such an outcome
disregards the actual homicide as a real threat and diminishes the
gravity of it. It is not merely a hypothetical, but a reality.115 As stated
in Sanchez, “limiting SB 1437’s malice inputting prohibition to
murder has the absurd consequence of incentivizing murder.”
Moreover, standard criminal liability notions for murder and
attempted murder demand that attempted murder is included in the
legislation. “An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements:
a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act
done toward its commission.”116 Thus, an attempted crime requires
the same mens rea, minimum, as the target offense and the penalties
for attempt and completed acts are also often the same. Which
reinforces the position to have the attempted crime included. Or else,
as mentioned earlier, it incentivizes murder.
If the California Supreme Court holds that attempted murder
does not apply under SB 1437 in the aider and abettor theory, it will
propagate the irrational consequence of incentivizing murder. It is
nonsensical for someone to be “incentivized” to ensure that their
victim die in order for them to qualify for a better sentencing
probability under this statute. “If this position is correct, then a
criminal defendant's liability turns inversely on the victim's
fortunes.”117 Taking into account the doctrine’s deterrence rationale,
113
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the absurd consequence is counterintuitive to the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.118 Such an absurd outcome cannot be
consistent with legislative intent, or fundamental justice for the
countless individuals currently serving sentences as an accomplice to
an attempted murder.
IV.

Conclusion

In this Note, I argue that the applicability of SB 1437
encompasses or should extend to those convicted of attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences theory as aider and
abettors. Part I analyzed the history of the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequence theory in California. Specifically,
how it applies to accomplices, aider and abettors and expanded
discussion on principles of crime and punishment as it pertains to
crime deterrence. It also explained the history and purpose of SB 1437.
In Part II, I discussed specific law changes made under Senate Bill
1437. This included a breakdown of the current cases and circuit split
debating whether attempted murder liability is covered under the
changes made in SB 1437. In Part III, my analysis, I argued that the
Supreme Court of California should hold that attempted murder
liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine is
inherently incorporated into SB 1437. In other words, the Court
should side with the decisions held in the Fifth District Court of
Appeal. Additionally, I urge and encourage action from California
Legislators to clarify SB 1437—reflecting my argument—to ensure
punishment is fair and just proportional to the crime.

is an undoubtedly absurd consequence of abrogating its applicability to murder but
not attempted murder.”).
118
Id. at 644.

